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Will the United States join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Comprehensive and 




The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed by all twelve negotiating parties1 on February 4, 
2016. To come into force, it requires ratification by at least six of the original signatories, which 
together account for at least 85% of the combined GDP of the original signatories in 2013. To date, 
only two countries have ratified the TPP: Japan and New Zealand. Because of the GDP 
requirement, the TPP cannot come into force without US ratification. 
 
On January 30, 2017, the US informed TPP signatories that it “does not intend to become a party 
to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” and that “it has no legal obligations arising from its 
signature.”2 This did not, however, doom the agreement; the eleven remaining signatories agreed 
on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which 
came into force on December 30, 2018. The CPTPP incorporates by reference the entire TPP 
agreement, with the exception of twenty-two provisions, many of which US negotiators had 
insisted on but were unpopular with the other TPP signatories, including provisions that would 
allow US investors to initiate claims for breaches of investment agreements and authorizations. 
These provisions would have established a high degree of protection for US investors, but they 
were opposed by states that would be subject to additional legal risk. 
 
On April 13, 2018, President Trump unexpectedly instructed administration officials to examine 
the possibility of “re-joining” the TPP.3 This is unlikely in the near future, given the Trump 
administration’s opposition to the agreement in its current form. But if the US ratified the existing 
text, the TPP would need only three additional ratifications to come into force, including one from 
either Australia, Canada or Mexico, due to the GDP requirement. Other signatories would be 
incentivized to follow the US and ratify the TPP to secure better access to the US market. 
Moreover, under the TPP’s terms, the first six original ratifying signatories receive certain benefits, 
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such as the authority to determine whether other countries can join TPP.4 US ratification could 
thus instigate a race among signatories to ratify TPP to qualify as one of the six. 
 
Alternatively, the US could seek to join the CPTPP. This option becomes more likely the longer 
CPTPP is in force as it will progressively liberalize trade flows among countries, while TPP 
commitments become dated. However, CPTPP accession is “subject to such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed between the Parties and that State,”5 and the TPP provisions that are suspended 
in the CPTPP, including those that establish a high degree of protection for US investors, can only 
subsequently be unsuspended with unanimous consent.6 Therefore, the CPTPP parties may allow 
the US to accede, but not without negotiation—and the US is unlikely to get any special treatment 
if it wanted to join, including with respect to the suspended provisions. Thus, to re-engage in 
negotiations, the US would have to weigh the value of the suspended TPP provisions against access 
to liberalized trade flows under CPTPP. If the US places a high value on the suspended provisions, 
it could ratify the TPP in the hope of incentivizing others to follow suit. Otherwise, it will be 
required to negotiate with the CPTPP parties.  
 
Given the Trump administration’s opposition to multilateral, rather than bilateral, trade 
agreements, ratification of either the TPP or the CPTPP is unlikely in the near future. However, 
the administration has been criticized for forfeiting US influence in the Pacific Rim and for 
allowing China to fill in the void with its plans for a Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership and its Belt and Road initiative. Moreover, while the CPTPP is leaner than the original 
accord (without the US, it covers roughly 15% of the global economy, rather than 40% under the 
TPP), the revised pact is open to new members; economies such as Indonesia, the Philippines, the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the UK have stated publicly that they are considering 
joining the CPTPP. An open agreement has the potential to create trade benefits higher than a TPP 
with the US on board. The US may, therefore, seek to re-enter negotiations down the road to access 
these benefits and secure influence in the region.  
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